Indian Air Force
Bharatiya Vayu Sena
By Hans van HerkThe former British colony of India was divided into present-day India and Pakistan. India became an independent republic on 26th January 1950. It consists of 22 states and 9 union territories. A neutralist policy has been traditionally followed, although there have been several instances of military action, mostly against Pakistan, but also against the former Portuguese India (Goa) and against intruding forces on the Kashmir and Tibet borders. The President is the nominal Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but control is exercised through the Minister of Defence.
Indian Air Force
Bharatiya Vayu Sena
The Indian Air Force is a young service. The oldest of its units is only 60 years old. Its birth in 1932 and its growth to date can be conveniently divided into four 15-year periods: 1932 - 1947 - 1962 - 1977 - 1992. By a coincidence these dates correspond to the major changes in the structure, composition and the capability of the Air Force. The 1990s started on a very unfortunate note for the Indian Air Force in particular. Economic difficulties along with the collapse of the Soviet Union severely affected expansion and modernisation plans, and various key programmes were pushed back by at least half a decade. Major problems with the availability of spares and support from the ex-USSR affected operations severely during 1991-1994, and serviceability rates declined heavily. Recovery started in the mid 1990s, when India learned from tense lessons. Much needed overhaul facilities were established and where possible, equipment and spares were saved through the widespread use of simulators. The average pilot flight hours are back to the standard 180-200 figure.The formulation in 1997 of India's first ever Air Power Doctrine (APD) provided the main map to modernisation and ensures that the Indian Air Force remains a viable deterrent against its principal potential adversaries.
The Indian Air Force has accepted that the increased costs of maintaining a modern and effective air force in the future would necessitate a reduction in quantitative levels. The MiG-21bis-UPG (or MiG-21 Bison as they are called by the IAF) upgrade programme is finally well underway. IAF's second-generation fighter types - the MiG-29 and Mirage 2000 - will see an intensive avionics upgrade as well as the ability for some of the MiG-29s being equipped for air refuelling. The multi-role capability and very high serviceability of the Mirage 2000 (close to 90%), has led the Indian Air Force placing an order for an additional ten aircraft to be delivered by 2004. The Sukhoi Su-30MK/MKI is the most important combat aircraft programme currently underway. The licence production of this combat aircraft is to start in 2004 and will be completed by 2017. The first Su-30MKs (eighteen aircraft in service with No. 24 Squadron) will be converted to the MKI configuration as soon as the 32 Su-30MKIs built in Russia have been delivered by 2003.As far as training is concerned the Indian Air Force finally agreed on the choice for the Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) programme. The contract for a total of 66 Hawk Mk132 was officially signed in Delhi on March 26, 2004. The first Hawks can be found on the productionline at BAE Warton. The delivery schedule for the UK build Hawks will be between September 2007 and February 2008 whereas the locally build Hawks will be delivered between 2008 and 2010. In the meantime, the HJT-36 Sitara (Intermediate Jet Trainer) is under full-scale development and is expected to enter service in 2004 to replace the HJT-16 Kiran. The HQ of the Indian Air Force Command is located at Delhi and is commanded by the Chief of Air Staff. The Indian AF currently has five operational commands, each of which is under an AOC-in-C (Air Officer Commander-in-Chief) with the rank of Air Marshal. The IAF also has two additional commands - Training Command and Maintenance Command - to maintain a uniform standard in training and maintenance.
Indian Air Force
IITians aspire to join Indian Air Force
Bangalore, February 3: Over 100 IIT graduates have aspired to join the Indian Air Force even as IAF recruited over 8,000 airmen and officers in the current year, Chief of Air staff Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy said on Tuesday.
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“We had an intake of over 8,000 airmen and officers this year, up from 3,000 last year,” he said to the reporters after inaugurating the international seminar on flight testing and flight test training, at the IAF’s aircraft systems and training establishment here.
IAF, he said, was attracting people with quality and there was no requirement for Short Service Commission (SSC) officers.
“Earlier we used to reemploy retired officers as SSC, now we feel there is no need to reemploy retired personnel and no SSCS, other than women,” Krishnaswamy said.
IAF, he said, was attracting people with quality and there was no requirement for Short Service Commission (SSC) officers.
“Earlier we used to reemploy retired officers as SSC, now we feel there is no need to reemploy retired personnel and no SSCS, other than women,” Krishnaswamy said.
'Times of India' misleads country with 'surgical strikes' claims
December 08, 2008- In a news story this morning, vaguely attributed to 'military brass,' the Times of India has claimed that India possess the ability to surgically strike at terrorists training camps in Pakistan.
Nothing could be further from the truth. An attempt to carry out such a strike would likely end in severe embarrassment for the country, if not outright disaster.
Surprisingly, the story suggests that the IAF could carry out such strikes using laser guided bombs delivered by Sukhoi-30MKIs, Mirage-2000s and Jaguars. It would have been more plausible if the capability had been attributed to an operational Brahmos missile unit with the Army, if there is indeed such a unit.
It would be fool hardy for the IAF to undertake a strike mission into Pakistan without first softening its air defense through attacks on fighter and missile bases as well as air defense radar. But that is hardly possible if you do not first declare war!
With Pakistani fighters and missiles in a high state of alert for such a 'surprise' strike several IAF aircraft are likely to be shot down, resulting in not just loss of face but a huge mess because pilots of the shot down aircraft are likely to be captured by Pakistan!
Another more chilling consequence of such a 'surprise' surgical strike is that it could be construed as a nuclear attack by Pakistan. Despite the DRDO charade about our Agni missile variants, India's nuclear deterrent continues to be fighter aircraft based and a 'surprise' Indian fighter attack could be construed as a surprise nuclear attack!! Pakistan has no way of knowing if the incoming Indian aircraft are carrying nuclear or conventional bombs.
It would be ridiculous for Pakistan to assume the attack was nuclear, but no one is crediting Pakistan with much sanity these days.
Besides what would such a surgical strike accomplish? It is not as if the terrorists are going to be waiting in their camps to be bombed. Even if they are caught off guard, all they have to do is jump into a trench to save themselves.
Ironically, Pakistan could carry out such a surgical strike much more easily using its Babur missiles. A Babur missile attack will not require softening of Indian air defenses and if one of the attacking missile was shot down by Indian defenses, a highly unlikely scenario, there would be no Pakistani pilot to capture!
A Babur missile attack by Pakistan would never be construed as a nuclear attack by India because our leadership is sane and Pakistan's nuclear deterrent is missile based.
IAF's quest for a MRCA - Why the Hornet is the strongest contender
AESA radar technology that the IAF can acquire through the purchase of F/A-18E/F Hornets represents a technological edge that is simply too significant for the IAF to overlook. F/A-18E/F AESA radar technology that the IAF can acquire through the purchase of F/A-18E/F Hornets represents a technological edge that is simply too significant for the IAF to overlook. According to unclassified US defense papers AESA provides 10-30 times more net radar capability plus significant advantages in the areas of range resolution, countermeasure resistance and flexibility. These are significant, almost revolutionary numbers. Using it AESA AN/APG-79 radar a F/A-18E/F can now detect and identify targets beyond the reach of the Super Hornet's AIM-120 Slammer missiles. Though the exact range and resolution of the radar are classified an inference can be made for the fact that the AIM-120 missile has a reported range of over 30 nm. How much over, no one knows at this point. However, it is the author's opinion that once US officials in their negotiation with IAF allude to actual detection ranges that an AESA equipped F/A-18E/F could achieve a lot of jaws will drop at Air HQs The enabling technology for AESA is Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) monolithic microwave integrated circuit (MMIC) which uses lithographic-type processes to produce microwave circuits on chips at very high levels of integration. A modern X-band T/R module, in addition to a radiating element, will contain five to seven chips (MMICs) produced in a foundry and later integrated into a substrate with a few discrete components and cooling provisions, all filling a space on the order of 1/4 cu in.
Raytheon AN/APG-79 AESA radar that equips US Navy F/A-18E/F
It is not easy to make chips out of GaAs. It took almost two decades for the fabrication technology to move from bespoke manufacture to industrial strength mass production. Though it is true that this technology is already being put into cellphones, broadcast satellite receivers and TV sets it is likely that commercial use of GaAs chips is tightly controlled. Currently, the only country in the world that has AESA technology is the US which acquired the technology after years of research and huge investments. The EU and Israel are reportedly next in line to acquire AESA, only because the flow of GaAs MMIC chips to these countries will not remain restricted for long due to commercial imperative. Under the circumstances, it is unlikely that Russia will acquire AESA for sometime to come. Today, the IAF has the opportunity to acquire fighters equipped with AESA radars either through the purchase of F-16s from Lockheed or F/A-18E/F from Boeing. It is an opportunity that the IAF cannot ignore simply for the reason that it is almost certain that PAF will acquire F-16 equipped with AESA radars. The IAF simply cannot wait for EU, Israel and eventually Russia to acquire AESA. By doing so it would once again cede a technological edge to the PAF, something it has repeatedly done in the past. After spurring the US offer, if the IAF were to eventually acquire AESA radars form the EU or Israel it is very likely that such transfers would be monitored and controlled by the US. What purpose would such a delay in committing to the best technology serve other than giving Pakistan another window of opportunity for a Kargil style operation?
Raytheon AN/APG-79 AESA radar that equips US Navy F/A-18E/F
It is not easy to make chips out of GaAs. It took almost two decades for the fabrication technology to move from bespoke manufacture to industrial strength mass production. Though it is true that this technology is already being put into cellphones, broadcast satellite receivers and TV sets it is likely that commercial use of GaAs chips is tightly controlled. Currently, the only country in the world that has AESA technology is the US which acquired the technology after years of research and huge investments. The EU and Israel are reportedly next in line to acquire AESA, only because the flow of GaAs MMIC chips to these countries will not remain restricted for long due to commercial imperative. Under the circumstances, it is unlikely that Russia will acquire AESA for sometime to come. Today, the IAF has the opportunity to acquire fighters equipped with AESA radars either through the purchase of F-16s from Lockheed or F/A-18E/F from Boeing. It is an opportunity that the IAF cannot ignore simply for the reason that it is almost certain that PAF will acquire F-16 equipped with AESA radars. The IAF simply cannot wait for EU, Israel and eventually Russia to acquire AESA. By doing so it would once again cede a technological edge to the PAF, something it has repeatedly done in the past. After spurring the US offer, if the IAF were to eventually acquire AESA radars form the EU or Israel it is very likely that such transfers would be monitored and controlled by the US. What purpose would such a delay in committing to the best technology serve other than giving Pakistan another window of opportunity for a Kargil style operation?
Sukhoi Su-30MKI
The Sukhoi Su-30 MKI (NATO reporting name Flanker-H) is a variant of the Sukhoi Su-30, jointly-developed by Russia's Sukhoi Corporation and India's Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for the Indian Air Force (IAF). It is an air superiority fighter which can also act as a multirole, strike fighter jet.
The development of the variant started after India signed a deal with Russia in 2000 to manufacture 140 Su-30 fighter jets. The first Russian-made Su-30MKI variant was integrated into the IAF in 2002, while the first indigenous Su-30MKI entered service with the IAF in 2004. In 2007, the IAF ordered 40 additional MKIs.
Capable of carrying nuclear weapons and tailor-made for Indian specifications, the fighter jet integrates Indian systems and avionics. It also contains French and Israeli subsystems. The MKI variant features several improvements over the basic K and MK variants and is classified as a 4.5 generation fighter. Due to similar features and components, the MKI variant is often considered to be a customized Indian variant of the Sukhoi Su-35.
Are Indian Fighter Pilots better than US Fighter Pilots?
The first bilateral dissimilar air combat (DACT) exercise between the U.S. Air Force and the Indian air force in more than 40 years, Cope India 2004, took place at Gawalior, . Did the IAF pilots out perform the USAF pilots during the exercise.
A Broad Perspective
The US armed forces are primarily equipped and trained for intervention around the globe, not for homeland security. It is very difficult for anyone to conceive of a situation where US troops will be asked to defend their homeland. As such, US strategic thinkers appreciate that relying on human motivation to win a conflict in a distant part of the globe is not practical. Consequently, the mindset is to always fight a war from a position of overwhelming material advantage so as to minimize casualties. Material losses are a concern for the US armed forces, but only because they temporarily reduce their material advantage, not because they result in a financial squeeze. Indeed, increased consumption of material assets by the armed forces can invigorate the US economy! However, human losses are a huge concern because they can result in rapid weakening of public support for the intervention. Recent history has seen the US concede defeat to puny Vietnam just because its public was not prepared to accept any further loss of US lives.
The Indian armed forces are primarily equipped and trained for homeland security and engage the enemy only to keep the enemy at bay. Indian strategic thinkers can, therefore, count on high motivation levels of its troops. The public too is more accepting of high casualty rates under these circumstances. The Kargil conflict was a manifestation of what I am saying. The Indian commanders had the option to choose between human or material assets to win the heights back from the enemy. The fact that they chose the former was foolhardy but illustrative. The US will never commit its troops to battle under similar circumstances.
For India, material losses are the huge concern. This is so because most of the material assets used by our armed forces originate abroad and are purchased using scarce foreign exchange. High material losses result not just in a tactical paucity but can result in a long term degradation of the country’s ability to wage war and a serious weakening of its economy.
Cope India 2004 Perspective
In the context of what we discussed above, it should be clear to us that the US pilots are not primed to engage the enemy on a level playing field. If they did so they would not be assured of a victory. They are primed to engage only when they enjoy an overwhelming superiority. For them, only abject desperation will justify an engagement on a level playing field!
This is not to suggest that the USAF pilots do not train to fight on a level playing field. They do, and that is why they came to Gawalior.
A USAF pilot relies on the electronics within his aircraft to tilt the odds in his favor. Some of you may wonder, why just the electronics, why not the better maneuverability of its fighters? The answer is simple. While US fighters are without compare when it comes to the combination of electronics and maneuverability, when it comes to maneuverability alone, they are not always the best! In visual combat a Mig 21 Bis and Mirage 2000 could give a tough time to an F-16 or F-15C. A Mig29 will most likely out maneuver them and a Su-30K or Su-30MKI, with its vectored thrust and super maneuverability, will most certainly chew them up.
For USAF F-15C pilots, like the ones that participated in Cope Thunder, a typical air defense mission would start of as a long-range patrol under control of an AWACS that is looking deep into enemy territory. The AWACS will pick up an enemy attack much before it crossed the border. It would guide the F-15Cs to an intercept feeding them positional data over telemetry. Around a hundred miles or so from the enemy fighters the F-15Cs would switch on their own individual radars, acquire the enemy aircraft and launch their long-range air-to-air missiles.
In the rare case where enemy aircraft are able to continue with the attack the F-15Cs would continue for a close in engagement provided they enjoyed a clear cut numerical advantage or were opposed by less maneuverable aircraft. If that is not the case, they would head home and allow other air defense assets to take on the attacking aircraft.
The Playing Field at Gawalior
During Cope India 2004 the USAF F-15Cs were tasked with the defense of Gawalior AF Base. The Indian Air Forces aircraft were tasked with attacking Gawalior. Miarage 2000s, Su-30Ks, MiG-29 and MiG-21 Bis escorted the Indian strike force consisting of MiG-27s. For some reason, possibly security concerns raised by the Indians, the F-15Cs operated without an AWACS. That one factor probably leveled the playing field for the Americans
Forced to rely on Indian ground radars and / or their own airborne radars the F-15Cs must have felt crippled. Their misery was probably compounded by the fact that the attack force enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority. The F-15C pilots would have been easily overwhelmed by multiple targets detected minutes before they came into visual range.
Yet another factor against them must have been the fact that the cream of the Indian Air Force mans Mirage, MiG-29 and Su-30 squadrons. These squadrons constitute our most valuable and limited assets. On the other hand the F-15C is the workhorse aircraft in the USAF.
Conclusion
I am inclined to believe that the playing field at Gawalior was tilted against the USAF pilots. If the US pilots did end up with adverse kill ratios it should surprise no one, least of all the USAF generals. However, it would present them with a wonderful opportunity to scare the US Congress into releasing additional funds for the F/A-22 Raptor. Priced at 187 million dollar a piece, the F/A-22 Raptor is a dream machine that, with its super maneuverability, stealth and radar jamming ability would have easily ruled the sky even in the playing field at Gawalior.
USAF pilots do not usually train to fight enemy pilots. Instead, they train to shoot them down much before the enemy aircraft can come in close enough to fight with them. Given the right circumstances USAF pilots do their jobs very well! So the question whether Indian fighter pilots are better than USAF fighter pilots is moot. They probably are if they get to fight them!. Like they did at Gawalior. But that was an exercise. In actual combat, however, they will probably be taken out long before they get to engage the USAF pilots.
Even if Indian pilots are better than USAF pilots, the USAF is better than the IAF. Indeed, the USAF could rule the Indian skies any time it chose to.
A Broad Perspective
The US armed forces are primarily equipped and trained for intervention around the globe, not for homeland security. It is very difficult for anyone to conceive of a situation where US troops will be asked to defend their homeland. As such, US strategic thinkers appreciate that relying on human motivation to win a conflict in a distant part of the globe is not practical. Consequently, the mindset is to always fight a war from a position of overwhelming material advantage so as to minimize casualties. Material losses are a concern for the US armed forces, but only because they temporarily reduce their material advantage, not because they result in a financial squeeze. Indeed, increased consumption of material assets by the armed forces can invigorate the US economy! However, human losses are a huge concern because they can result in rapid weakening of public support for the intervention. Recent history has seen the US concede defeat to puny Vietnam just because its public was not prepared to accept any further loss of US lives.
The Indian armed forces are primarily equipped and trained for homeland security and engage the enemy only to keep the enemy at bay. Indian strategic thinkers can, therefore, count on high motivation levels of its troops. The public too is more accepting of high casualty rates under these circumstances. The Kargil conflict was a manifestation of what I am saying. The Indian commanders had the option to choose between human or material assets to win the heights back from the enemy. The fact that they chose the former was foolhardy but illustrative. The US will never commit its troops to battle under similar circumstances.
For India, material losses are the huge concern. This is so because most of the material assets used by our armed forces originate abroad and are purchased using scarce foreign exchange. High material losses result not just in a tactical paucity but can result in a long term degradation of the country’s ability to wage war and a serious weakening of its economy.
Cope India 2004 Perspective
In the context of what we discussed above, it should be clear to us that the US pilots are not primed to engage the enemy on a level playing field. If they did so they would not be assured of a victory. They are primed to engage only when they enjoy an overwhelming superiority. For them, only abject desperation will justify an engagement on a level playing field!
This is not to suggest that the USAF pilots do not train to fight on a level playing field. They do, and that is why they came to Gawalior.
A USAF pilot relies on the electronics within his aircraft to tilt the odds in his favor. Some of you may wonder, why just the electronics, why not the better maneuverability of its fighters? The answer is simple. While US fighters are without compare when it comes to the combination of electronics and maneuverability, when it comes to maneuverability alone, they are not always the best! In visual combat a Mig 21 Bis and Mirage 2000 could give a tough time to an F-16 or F-15C. A Mig29 will most likely out maneuver them and a Su-30K or Su-30MKI, with its vectored thrust and super maneuverability, will most certainly chew them up.
For USAF F-15C pilots, like the ones that participated in Cope Thunder, a typical air defense mission would start of as a long-range patrol under control of an AWACS that is looking deep into enemy territory. The AWACS will pick up an enemy attack much before it crossed the border. It would guide the F-15Cs to an intercept feeding them positional data over telemetry. Around a hundred miles or so from the enemy fighters the F-15Cs would switch on their own individual radars, acquire the enemy aircraft and launch their long-range air-to-air missiles.
In the rare case where enemy aircraft are able to continue with the attack the F-15Cs would continue for a close in engagement provided they enjoyed a clear cut numerical advantage or were opposed by less maneuverable aircraft. If that is not the case, they would head home and allow other air defense assets to take on the attacking aircraft.
The Playing Field at Gawalior
During Cope India 2004 the USAF F-15Cs were tasked with the defense of Gawalior AF Base. The Indian Air Forces aircraft were tasked with attacking Gawalior. Miarage 2000s, Su-30Ks, MiG-29 and MiG-21 Bis escorted the Indian strike force consisting of MiG-27s. For some reason, possibly security concerns raised by the Indians, the F-15Cs operated without an AWACS. That one factor probably leveled the playing field for the Americans
Forced to rely on Indian ground radars and / or their own airborne radars the F-15Cs must have felt crippled. Their misery was probably compounded by the fact that the attack force enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority. The F-15C pilots would have been easily overwhelmed by multiple targets detected minutes before they came into visual range.
Yet another factor against them must have been the fact that the cream of the Indian Air Force mans Mirage, MiG-29 and Su-30 squadrons. These squadrons constitute our most valuable and limited assets. On the other hand the F-15C is the workhorse aircraft in the USAF.
Conclusion
I am inclined to believe that the playing field at Gawalior was tilted against the USAF pilots. If the US pilots did end up with adverse kill ratios it should surprise no one, least of all the USAF generals. However, it would present them with a wonderful opportunity to scare the US Congress into releasing additional funds for the F/A-22 Raptor. Priced at 187 million dollar a piece, the F/A-22 Raptor is a dream machine that, with its super maneuverability, stealth and radar jamming ability would have easily ruled the sky even in the playing field at Gawalior.
USAF pilots do not usually train to fight enemy pilots. Instead, they train to shoot them down much before the enemy aircraft can come in close enough to fight with them. Given the right circumstances USAF pilots do their jobs very well! So the question whether Indian fighter pilots are better than USAF fighter pilots is moot. They probably are if they get to fight them!. Like they did at Gawalior. But that was an exercise. In actual combat, however, they will probably be taken out long before they get to engage the USAF pilots.
Even if Indian pilots are better than USAF pilots, the USAF is better than the IAF. Indeed, the USAF could rule the Indian skies any time it chose to.
Indian MRCA Competition
The Indian Air Force Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) Competition, commonly known as the MRCA Tender, is an ongoing competition to supply the Indian Air Force with 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft. The Defence Ministry has allocated Rs. 42,000 crore for the purchase of these aircraft (Approx. US$10.5 billion).
The Aircarft
1.Rafale
2.Eurofighter Typhoon
3.F-16INFighting Falcon
4.F/A-18E/FSuper Hornet
5.JAS 39 NG
6.MiG-35Fulcrum-F
Present status
On 8 August 2008, the IAF Chief Air Marshal Fali H. Major informed that technical evaluations were being conducted and claimed that the IAF is all set to conduct field trials of the MRCA bidding aircraft in the second half of 2008.The industry offset proposals from the bidders have been provided to India as of 11 August 2008.
As of 18 November 2008, the technical evaluation of the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) has been completed. The IAF hoped to start its flight evaluation by February 2009.The aircraft will be put through a rigorous testing process at Bangalore, Jaisalmer and Leh. The aircraft will undergo technical and humid condition tests in Bangalore. Desert trials will be conducted in Jaisalmer, Rajasthan and High-altitude and mountainous condition trials will be conducted at Leh in Ladakh.Reportedly, after technical evaluation of the bids, the number of contenders has been reduced to three or four.There have been fears that this process would take a few years at least, and getting the aircraft after that would take longer. It is reasonable to expect that the aircraft can be delivered no sooner than 2011. This might take longer for the Super Hornet, Rafale and Typhoon, considering their numbers already on order.
The Aircarft
1.Rafale
2.Eurofighter Typhoon
3.F-16INFighting Falcon
4.F/A-18E/FSuper Hornet
5.JAS 39 NG
6.MiG-35Fulcrum-F
Present status
On 8 August 2008, the IAF Chief Air Marshal Fali H. Major informed that technical evaluations were being conducted and claimed that the IAF is all set to conduct field trials of the MRCA bidding aircraft in the second half of 2008.The industry offset proposals from the bidders have been provided to India as of 11 August 2008.
As of 18 November 2008, the technical evaluation of the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) has been completed. The IAF hoped to start its flight evaluation by February 2009.The aircraft will be put through a rigorous testing process at Bangalore, Jaisalmer and Leh. The aircraft will undergo technical and humid condition tests in Bangalore. Desert trials will be conducted in Jaisalmer, Rajasthan and High-altitude and mountainous condition trials will be conducted at Leh in Ladakh.Reportedly, after technical evaluation of the bids, the number of contenders has been reduced to three or four.There have been fears that this process would take a few years at least, and getting the aircraft after that would take longer. It is reasonable to expect that the aircraft can be delivered no sooner than 2011. This might take longer for the Super Hornet, Rafale and Typhoon, considering their numbers already on order.
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